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Creating a Civil Remedy in Georgia
for Survivors of Out-of-State
Childhood Sexual Abuse
*

Alexandra H. Bradley
I. INTRODUCTION
Sexual abuse casts long shadows and causes long-lasting effects on its
survivors, particularly children.1 Especially tragic, most abused children
are abused by an adult whom that child knows and trusts.2 This abuse
by anyone, especially by a child’s parents or close family friend, often
causes lifelong emotional damage. Survivors generally do not recognize
the extent of their abuse until many years later.
This late onset or delayed discovery has made it difficult for courts to
provide redress. Although technically children could sue their abuser
when the abuse occurs, children generally do not know they have a cause
of action, nor do they have structures around them directing them to

*My sincerest thanks to my family, especially to my parents, Stephen and Lisa Bradley,
without whom I could not function nor flourish. I would also like to thank Professor Daisy
H. Floyd for her thoughtful insight and direction throughout the writing process for this
Casenote. My gratitude extends further to everyone who took the time to edit my work, to
speak with me about this topic, or to extend their encouragement along the way. Finally,
to all survivors of childhood sexual abuse, may you know that you are far more than what
was done to you, and that while justice cannot truly be provided, people are fighting to
provide justifiable redress.
1. Childhood sexual abuse survivors are more likely to experience post-traumatic
stress disorder, depressive and suicidal states, or drug or alcohol abuse than those who
were not sexually abused as a minor. This list of possible effects is not exhaustive. For
further information on the impacts of childhood sexual abuse, see Childhood Sexual Abuse
TO
LIGHT,
https://www.d2l.org/wpStatistics,
DARKNESS
content/uploads/2017/01/all_statistics_20150619.pdf (last visited Apr. 25, 2022).
2. See Brief of Amicus Curiae for Petitioner at II, Philip Doe v. Saint Catholic Church,
et al., 2022 Ga. LEXIS *59, (No. S21T0469) (describing a case of childhood sexual abuse in
a Catholic Church and the long-term effects of that abuse, while also explaining the
importance of holding entities accountable for covering up childhood sexual abuse).
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their legal rights.3 For this reason, in 2015, Georgia’s legislature provided
survivors with a statutory civil cause of action via the Hidden Predator
Act (HPA), Official Code of Georgia Annotated section 9-3-33.1.4 The HPA
allows survivors to bypass what would otherwise be time-barred claims
and, in theory, to sue their abusers for monetary damages during
adulthood once the survivors become aware of their abuse.5
The HPA provided a brief period that allowed for childhood sexual
abuse survivors to sue for previously time-barred civil claims arising out
of their abuse.6 Under this brief period, the plaintiff in Harvey v.
Merchan,7 Joy Caroline Harvey Merchan (Merchan), sued her parents for
twenty-two years of sexual abuse.8 With Harvey, the Georgia Supreme
Court paved the way for childhood sexual assault survivors to sue in
Georgia for their abuse that occurred out of the state.9
While the Harvey decision and implementation of the HPA were
important steps towards providing survivors full redress for their abuse

3. This is assuming that the child has had time to properly process their abuse. On
average, a survivor is not fully aware of the extent of their abuse until the age of fifty-two.
Telephone Interview with Melina D. Lewis, Wilbanks Child Endangerment and Sexual
Exploitation Clinic Post-Graduate Fellow (Sept. 17, 2021).
4. Hidden Predator Act, O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33.1 (2019).
5. Although the HPA provides survivors potential monetary remedies or injunctions,
survivors’ damages may not be properly rectified by these means. Generally, survivors want
to hear “I’m sorry,” or “what I did to you was wrong,” and to have their abuser(s) kept away
from other children. Civil courts cannot provide these remedies. Telephone Interview with
Jean Goetz Mangan, Legal Writing Instructor at the University of Georgia School of Law,
First to Try a Case Under the Hidden Predator Act to Verdict (Oct. 6, 2021). The Act does
not always work as well in practice. See infra Section V.
6. 311 Ga. 811, 860 S.E.2d 561 (2021).
7. The period lasted for two years. This period allowed
[P]laintiffs of any age who were time barred from filing a civil action for injuries
resulting from childhood sexual abuse due to the expiration of the statute of
limitations in effect on June 30, 2015 . . . to file such actions against the
individual alleged to have committed such abuse before July 1, 2017, thereby
reviving those civil actions which had lapsed or technically expired under the
law in effect on June 30, 2015.
O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33.1(d)(1) (2017).
8. Id. at 811, 860 S.E.2d at 565. The Wilbanks CEASE Clinic at the University of
Georgia School of Law brought this case on behalf of Merchan. The Wilbanks CEASE Clinic
represents childhood sexual abuse or exploitation survivors in civil lawsuits, as well as in
juvenile dependency proceedings. See University of Georgia School of Law Wilbanks Child
Endangerment and Sexual Exploitation Clinic, Supreme Court of Georgia Sides with
(Jun.
21,
2021),
CEASE
on
Hidden
Predator
Act
Case,
CEASE
https://cease.law.uga.edu/supreme-court-georgia-sides-cease-hidden-predator-act-case.
9. The out of state action must still have jurisdiction in the Georgia court. Harvey,
311 Ga. at 811, 860 S.E.2d at 565.
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and deterring future abuse, the legislature still has steps it needs to take
to achieve these goals adequately.10
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Merchan allegedly endured sexual abuse by her parents throughout
her childhood, from her earliest memories, to when she moved out of her
parents’ home.11 This abuse occurred in Quebec, Canada and Savannah,
Georgia.12 When Merchan and her parents (Harveys) lived in Quebec, she
was “sexually abused . . . frequently and repeatedly.”13 Merchan and her
parents left Quebec and moved to Savannah when Merchan was fifteen.14
After moving to Savannah, Merchan stated the “physical abuse ‘died
down’ and ‘seemed to not be as prevalent,’” but her father would continue
to watch her shower and comment on her body.15 After Merchan moved
out, she experienced the trauma that often follows abuse.16 She is still
dealing with the damages to her mental and emotional health today.17
Merchan moved out of her parents’ home at twenty-two, but did not
sue her parents until she turned forty.18 She was able to sue under the
revival window in the HPA.19 She sued for negligence, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, sexual battery, and assault.20 The
Harveys responded by filing a motion to dismiss and a motion for
summary judgment.21 In their motions, the Harveys argued that the HPA
did not create a cause of action for acts of abuse that occurred after the
10. Id.
11. At this stage of the complaint, the facts of the case have not been tried. Under the
Harveys’ motion to dismiss, the court must take the alleged facts in the complaint as true.
Complaints must be alleged with facts that are plausible on their face, which allows courts
to take them as true in pre-trial motions. The word choice of “allegedly” here is not to
insinuate that the claims of sexual abuse are any more or less credible, but to accurately
describe the stage of the case. The facts of this case may be tried in the future for their
truth. Id. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (deciding a complaint must be written
in such as a way that it can be taken as “plausible on its face”).
12. Harvey, 311 Ga. at 811, 860 S.E.2d at 565.
13. Id. at 812, 860 S.E.2d at 566.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Oral Argument at 22:18, Harvey v. Merchan, 311 Ga. 811, 860 S.E.2d 561, 565
(2021) (No. S21A0143), https://www.gasupreme.us/oral-arguments-february-04-2021.
17. Harvey, 311 Ga. at 812, 860 S.E.2d at 566.
18. Id. at 812 n.2, 860 S.E.2d at 566. Merchan is currently working on her fourth
amended complaint. Id.
19. O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33.1; see also Harvey, 311 Ga. at 811, 860 S.E.2d at 565.
20. Merchan brought this suit against the Harveys in June of 2017. Harvey, 311 Ga. at
812, 860 S.E.2d at 566.
21. The Harveys argued in the alternative in their two motions. Id.
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age of eighteen or for acts that occurred outside Georgia.22 The motions
also argued that the HPA violated the Due Process Clause, the Equal
Protection Clause, and Georgia’s constitutional prohibition against
retroactive laws. The Carroll Superior Court granted the motion to
dismiss the negligence claim, but otherwise denied the motions. The trial
court concluded that if the mens rea and actus reus elements of the action
under the HPA are met, a tort from another jurisdiction can be brought
in Georgia.23
Ultimately, these questions were before the Georgia Supreme Court.24
The first was whether Georgia or Canadian law applied to Merchan’s
claims.25 The second was whether O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33.1 applies to the
incidents that occurred in Quebec.26 The third was whether Quebec’s or
Georgia’s statute of limitations applies.27 The fourth was whether the
continuing tort theory applies to Merchan’s claims.28 The final was if
O.C.G.A § 9-3-33.1 is unconstitutional.29
On the first, the court held that Georgia procedural law applied to all
incidents, Georgia substantive law applies only to the incidents that
occurred in Georgia, and Quebec substantive law applies to the incidents
that occurred in Quebec.30 On the second, the court concluded that
Merchan could press a claim for the abuse that occurred in Quebec
22. When a party intends to make a claim regarding the laws of another state or
country, that party must give notice to the opposing side. This notice may be given via
pleading or “‘other reasonable written notice.’” If the party does not give notice of their
intent, they lose the ability to rely on foreign law. The Harveys attempted to argue that
Merchan could not amend her pleading to include the explicit claim under foreign law. The
court concluded Merchan could still amend her pleading to include a claim under foreign
law because there had not been a pre-trial order made in this case. Id. at 818, 860 S.E.2d
at 570.
23. Id. at 813, 860 S.E.2d at 567; O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33.1.
24. The Harveys applied to the Georgia Supreme Court for interlocutory appeal after
their motions were denied. At this procedural posture, parties can bring an interlocutory
appeal for trial court’s decision that does not result in final judgments. The court granted
this appeal,
[T]o decide whether Georgia or Quebec law applies to Merchan’s claims, whether
O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33.1 can revive a cause of action for acts that did not occur in
Georgia, and whether Georgia’s constitutional ban on retroactive laws and the
due process and equal protection clauses of the federal and state constitutions
would bar Merchan’s pursuit of such a cause of action against her parents.
Harvey, 311 Ga. at 811, 860 S.E.2d at 566.
25. Id. at 813, 860 S.E.2d at 567.
26. Id. at 823, 860 S.E.2d at 573.
27. Id. at 817, 860 S.E.2d at 569.
28. Id. at 814, 860 S.E.2d at 568.
29. Id. at 811–12, 860 S.E.2d at 566.
30. Id.
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alongside her claims from Georgia.31 On the third, the Court determined
that whichever statute of limitations was shorter—Georgia’s or
Quebec’s—would apply.32 The court remanded this case to the trial court
to determine which statute of limitations is shorter and should apply.33
On the fourth, the court determined the continuing tort theory does not
apply to sexual assault claims.34 Finally, the court held that the HPA is
constitutional.35 The court expanded the scope of the Hidden Predator
Act to include civil claims for acts of abuse occurring outside of Georgia.36
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. An Overview of the Hidden Predator Act
1. Hidden Predator Act of 2015
a. Hidden Predator Act Today
Georgia’s Hidden Predator Act of 2015 opened the door for childhood
sexual assault survivors to sue as an adult if their claims had become
time-barred.37 Currently, the wording of the HPA allows survivors to sue
“on or before” they turn twenty-three and within two years of when they
“knew or had reason to know” of their abuse.38 A brief, two-year revival
period in the Act allowed “time-barred” plaintiffs of a “civil action for
injuries resulting from childhood sexual abuse” to be revived, but this
revival time has since been closed.39
The HPA has led to certain instances of redress for survivors. It helped
lead to the wave of sexual abuse claims against USA Gymnastics (USAG)
doctors and coaches, which ultimately led to the Larry Nassar (Nassar)

31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 812, 860 S.E.2d at 566.
34. Id. at 815, 860 S.E.2d at 568.
35. Id. at 823, 860 S.E.2d at 573.
36. Id. at 811–12, 860 S.E.2d at 566.
37. O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33.1
38. Id.
39. This retroactive period closed in 2017 and was only open for survivors to sue
individual perpetrators, not institutions. Merchan sued during this revival period. Her
claims were previously time barred, but the provision in the Hidden Predator Act allowed
her claims to be revived for a short period. Legislators expected this Act would bring about
far more litigation than it has thus far. Despite this expectation not being met, there have
been instances where survivors were compensated through the HPA. Id.; Harvey, 311 Ga.
at 811, 860 S.E.2d at 565.

1482

MERCER LAW REVIEW

Vol. 73

sexual abuse scandal.40 A Georgia case was “‘ground zero [for] the
litigation and fallout of USA Gymnastics.’”41 In Jane Doe v. USA
Gymnastics, a Savannah resident sued her USAG coach, William
McCabe (McCabe), for sexual abuse.42 Jane Doe was not the only victim,
and McCabe is now serving a thirty-year sentence for child sexual
exploitation from a separate case.43 After Jane Doe, The Indianapolis
Star (IndyStar) launched multiple investigations into USAG and their
coverup of sexual abuse.44 IndyStar intervened in Jane Doe’s suit, and
the HPA allowed them to retrieve documents from USAG, proving it was
covering up abuse.45 These documents exposed allegations and sexual
harassment complaints against McCabe.46 IndyStar published an article
about the case and investigation, which encouraged over 150 survivors to
come forward about their abuse by Nassar and about their reports to
USAG.47 Jane Doe’s courage compelled these survivors to speak out
against USAG, and the investigation results exposed the coverup, which
led to USAG’s leadership upheaval. Jane Doe also encouraged the fight
for HPA legislation to hold organizations liable for coverups.48

40. Beau Evans, Ga. House Panel Considers Reviving ‘Hidden Predator Act’ for 2020,
GEORGIA RECORDER (Oct. 25, 2019), https://georgiarecorder.com/2019/10/25/ga-housepanel-considers-reviving-hidden-predator-act-for-2020/; Riley Bunch, State Poised to
Reopen Hidden Predators Act, VALDOSTA DAILY TIMES (Oct. 31, 2019),
https://www.valdostadailytimes.com/news/local_news/state-poised-to-reopen-hiddenpredators-act/image_5f721356-d7f5-53b9-b2fb-788575767c88.html.
41. Alaa Elassar, How a Georgia Case, Law Paved the Way for USA Gymnastics
Doctor’s Downfall, ATLANTA J. CONST. (Jan. 26, 2018), https://www.ajc.com/news/state—
regional-govt—politics/how-georgia-case-law-paved-way-for-usa-gymnastics-doctordownfall/e0Cddwf56ivelwcQiKp13O/.
42. Specifically, Jane Doe sued for sexual exploitation. Jane Doe v. USA Gymnastics
was filed in 2013 and settled in 2018 on confidential terms. Jane Doe nor her family signed
a non-disclosure agreement. This settlement came around the same time as the 150
survivors told their stories of abuse by Nassar. Elassar, supra note 41; see Katheryn Tucker,
‘Jane Doe’ Behind USA Gymnastics Case Steps into Spotlight to Honor Survivors, DAILY
REPORT (Apr. 25, 2019), https://www.law.com/dailyreportonline/2019/04/25/jane-doebehind-usa-gymnastics-case-steps-into-spotlight-to-honorsurvivors/?slreturn=20220027163808).
43. Elassar, supra note 41.
44. Tucker, supra note 42.
45. Elassar, supra note 41. The Act required agencies to make records of child sexual
abuse available to the survivor, regardless of the status of the case. Id.
46. Id.
47. Tim Evans, IndyStar Seeks to Unseal Abuse Documents, INDYSTAR (Aug. 4, 2016),
https://www.indystar.com/story/news/investigations/2016/08/04/indystar-seeks-unsealusa-gymnastics-coach-abuse-documents/87912400/.
48. Evans, supra note 47; see also Juliet Mancur, U.S.A. Gymnastics and Abuse
Survivors Propose a $425 Million Payout, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 31, 2021),
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b. Statute of Limitations
Prior to the implementation of the HPA, Georgia’s statute of
limitations against claims of childhood sexual abuse was one of the
narrowest in the United States because it did not provide survivors time
to process or acknowledge their abuse.49 The civil statute of limitations
applied to abuse up until the survivor was twenty-three for claims
against individual perpetrators and twenty for claims against all other
defendants.50 Georgia’s current statute of limitations covers abuse that
occurred until the survivor turned twenty-three and allows for a delayed
discovery window of two years.51
c. Delayed Discovery Window
The delayed discovery window allows survivors of abuse “committed
on or after July 1, 2015,” to sue their abuser “[o]n or before the date the
plaintiff attains the age of 23 years; or [w]ithin two years from the date
the plaintiff knew or had reason to know of such abuse and that such
abuse resulted in injury to the plaintiff as established by competent
medical or psychological evidence.”52 The delayed discovery window of
two years after the date of discovery allows survivors time to
acknowledge or process their abuse in therapy. If a survivor files under
the delayed discovery window, there must be a pretrial hearing within
six months of filing the action to prove the true date of discovery.53 With
this window in place, childhood sexual abuse claims “do not accrue until
the victim knows two things: (1) that the conduct was abuse, and (2) that
the abuse resulted in an injury. From that point, they have two years to
bring a civil suit against the perpetrator.”54
As this delayed discovery window is only open to people twenty-three
or older that suffered abuse occurring on or after July 1, 2015, the courts

https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/01/sports/olympics/usa-gymnastics-payout-sexualabuse.html.
49. In 2002, Georgia’s statute of limitations for a survivor to bring suit was “age
[twenty-three] against perpetrators and age [twenty] against other defendants.” Georgia’s
limitation was not broadened to twenty-three until 2015. There was also no delayed
discovery window in Georgia’s statue until the HPA’s passage in 2015. Georgia Child Sex
Abuse SOLs, CHILDUSA, https://childusa.org/law/georgia/sex-abuse-sol/(last updated Apr.
21, 2021).
50. CHILDUSA, supra note 49.
51. O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33.1(2)(A).
52. Id.
53. O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33.1(2)(B).
54. Brief of Amicus Curiae for Petitioner at V, Philip Doe v. Saint Catholic Church, et
al., 2022 Ga. LEXIS *59, (No. S21T0469).
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have not seen much litigation under this provision yet.55 Increased
litigation may begin over the next several years due to the maturing age
of the survivors, which will qualify them under the delayed discovery
window.
2. Georgia’s Attempts to Amend the Hidden Predator Act
Legislators have been seeking to raise the age limit for the tolling
statute of limitation for the past few years.56 Advocates for the age range
increase have argued that many survivors do not realize they
experienced abuse or cannot fully process their childhood sexual abuse
until they reach a mature age.57 Advocates for this change compare the
long-term effects of childhood abuse to post-traumatic stress disorder
that is experienced by veterans.58
The proposed, updated version of HPA legislation will revisit the terms
of the HPA and will be voted on in the Georgia General Assembly,
beginning in January of 2022. The most recently proposed version of the
HPA offered an even broader window for survivors to bring suit, but was
not passed in the Senate.59 That version proposed expansion of the age
limit from twenty-three to fifty-two, and expanded the time limit of when
the survivor “knew or had reason to know of the abuse” from two years
to four years.60 Survivors could also sue entities or organizations that
55. Telephone Interview with Emma Hetherington, Clinical Assistant Professor and
Wilbanks Child Endangerment and Sexual Exploitation Clinic Director at the University
of Georgia School of Law (Sept. 15, 2021).
56. These proposed age increases range from twenty-three to thirty-eight since 2018,
and fifty-two in 2021. Child Victim Protection Act of 2021, Ga. H.R. Bill 109, Reg. Sess.
(2021); Beau Evans, Capitol Beat News Service, Georgia ‘Hidden Predator’ House Bill
Widens Statute of Limitations for Child Sex Abuse Lawsuits, ALBANY HERALD,
https://www.albanyherald.com/news/georgia-hidden-predator-house-bill-widens-statuteof-limitations-for-child-sex-abuse-lawsuits/article_38a78b24-608d-11ea-a676cf2ec7a8c290.html (last updated Apr. 12, 2021).
57. O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33.1.
58. Evans, supra note 56; “Child sexual abuse can have lifetime impacts on survivors—
especially without support. It can impact educational outcomes, lead to heightened
symptoms of posttraumatic stress disorder, higher suicidality, drug abuse, higher
likelihood of teen pregnancy and chronic health issues.” This list of impacts on childhood
sexual abuse survivors is not exhaustive, but these are the most prevalent. YWCA is on a
Mission: Child Sexual Abuse Facts, YWCA (Sept. 2017), https://www.ywca.org/wpcontent/uploads/WWV-CSA-Fact-Sheet-Final.pdf (elaborating further on the effects of
childhood sexual abuse on the survivors).
59. The 2020 proposed version of the Act was known as the Child Victim Protection Act
of 2021. It was passed in the House in February of 2021, twenty days after the oral
arguments before the Georgia Supreme Court in Harvey v. Merchan. Ga. H.R. Bill 109, Reg.
Sess. (2021).
60. O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33.1(2)(a).
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owed a duty of care to the survivor, knew of the abuse, and did not
interfere with eliminating the abuse, or covered up the abuse.61
Nonprofits and large institutions, such as Boy Scouts of America and
the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Atlanta, have strongly opposed any
expansion.62 These institutions fear they will receive extreme backlash
from expanding the statute of limitations and adding the coverup section
of the legislation.63 Those in opposition to the proposed change “[have
warned] it could unleash a wave of litigation capable of crippling
social-benefit groups like schools and churches.”64
B. Choice of Law
1. The Doctrine of Lex Loci Delicti
When claims containing actions committed outside of Georgia are
brought in front of a Georgia court with jurisdiction over the case, the
Georgia court must determine the applicable law.65 The court uses the
doctrine of lex loci delicti to make this determination.66 Under the
doctrine of lex loci delicti, the governing substantive law is that of the
place where the tort was committed.67 The applicable substantive law is
that of where the original tort occurred even though many damages of an
emotional nature arise after the tort occurs, and potentially in another
jurisdiction.68
The location of the original tort is that where the original action
occurred, not necessarily where the injuries occurred.69 For example, in
a recent Georgia Supreme Court decision, Auld v. Forbes, a minor was
killed on a school field trip to Belize.70 His mother argued that Georgia’s
statute of limitations and substantive law should apply because the field

61. The proposed legislation applied to “institution[s], agenc[ies], firm[s], business[es],
corporation[s], or other public or private legal organization[s][.]” O.C.G.A § 9-3-33.1(d)(1).
62. Evans, supra note 40.
63. Id.
64. Evans, supra note 56.
65. Auld v. Forbes, 309 Ga. 893, 848 S.E.2d. 876 (2020); see also Bullard v. MRA
Holding, LLC, 292 Ga. 748, 751, 740 S.E.2d 622, 625–26 (2013) (holding a videotape taken
in Florida but distributed nationwide and with the subject of the video residing in Georgia
can still constitute an injury being sustained within Georgia for the basis of applicable
substantive law).
66. Auld, 309 Ga. at 894, 848 S.E.2d at 879.
67. Lex loci delicti translates to “the law of the place where the injury was sustained.”
Id.; see Harvey, 311 Ga. at 813, 860 S.E.2d at 567.
68. Auld, 309 Ga. at 894, 848 S.E.2d at 879.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 893, 848 S.E.2d at 878.
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trip was planned in Georgia. The court dismissed her claim based on the
statute of limitations having run because the Belizean period was shorter
than Georgia’s, and the events giving rise to the claim occurred in
Belize.71 Although the planning of an event or the emotional effects
following an event may transpire in another jurisdiction, the court must
apply the jurisdiction’s substantive law where the event occurred, even if
the jurisdiction is outside of Georgia.72
2. Applicable Procedural Law
Applicable statutes of limitations are procedural questions that are
typically covered by the law of the jurisdiction where the action is
brought.73 Some claims based on foreign law are the exception to this
general procedural rule.74 This exception states:
[W]hen the applicable foreign law creates a cause of action that is not
recognized in the common law and includes a specific limitation period,
that limitation period is a substantive provision of the foreign law that
governs, and it applies when it is shorter than the period provided for
under Georgia law.75

When foreign law creates a claim that is not recognized in common
law, and that foreign law has a specific time limit, the statute of
limitations of the foreign law will apply when it is shorter than the one
afforded under Georgia law.76
C. Continuing Tort Theory
Generally, the statute of limitations for personal injury claims begins
to run as soon as the injury occurs.77 The continuing tort theory affords
plaintiffs an extended statute of limitations under certain
circumstances.78 A plaintiff can only sue under a continuing tort theory
when both “the wrong and the injury are unknown to the plaintiff” until

71. The court reasoned that since the actual death giving rise to the suit occurred in
Belize, that “the ‘last event necessary’ . . . took place in Belize, and that Belize was where
the injury was suffered.” Id. at 895, 848 S.E.2d at 879.
72. Id.
73. Harvey, 311 Ga. at 814, 860 S.E.2d at 567.
74. Id. (citing Auld, 309 Ga. at 895, 848 S.E.2d at 879).
75. Harvey, 311 Ga. at 814, 860 S.E.2d at 567 (quoting Auld, 309 Ga. at 895, 848 S.E.2d
at 880).
76. Harvey, 311 Ga. at 814, 860 S.E.2d at 567; Auld, 309 Ga. at 895, 848 S.E.2d at 880
(internal quotations omitted).
77. Everhart v. Rich’s, Inc., 229 Ga. 798, 801, 194 S.E.2d 425, 428 (1972).
78. Id. at 802, 194 S.E.2d at 428.
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after the injury occurred.79 The application of this theory has been
limited to personal injury claims.80
The continuing tort theory applies when the injured party discovers
both their injury and the wrongdoing after the injury occurred.81
Accordingly, in Everhart v. Rich’s Inc., the plaintiff suffered continued
exposure to hazardous materials.82 Despite the plaintiff’s injury
occurring as soon as they encountered the materials, due to their lack of
knowledge or warning of their exposure, the Georgia Supreme Court
concluded the continuing tort theory applied.83
The continuing tort theory applies when the injured party is unaware
of the wrongdoing and the injury, but does not apply to claims of sexual
abuse, according to the Georgia Supreme Court decision in Harvey.84
D. Constitutional Challenges
1. Georgia’s Ban on Retroactive Laws
According to the Georgia Constitution: “No . . . ex post facto law,
retroactive law, or laws . . . shall be passed.”85 Retroactive laws are
generally procedural laws, as they are statutes of limitations.86 Statutes
of limitations are procedural because they look only to if the party can

79. Harvey, 311 Ga. at 816, 860 S.E.2d at 569.
80. Child sexual abuse is a personal injury claim; it is a tort. Id. at 816, 860 S.E.2d at
568; Everhart, 229 Ga. at 801, 194 S.E.2d at 428 (1972).
81. Everhart, 229 Ga. at 802, 194 S.E.2d at 428–29.
82. Id. at 798, 194 S.E.2d at 425.
83. The tort in this case was one:
[O]f a continuing nature which tolls the statute of limitation so long as the
continued exposure to the hazard is occasioned by the continued failure of the
tortfeasor to warn the victim, and the statute of limitation does not commence
to run under these circumstances until such time as the continued tortious act
producing injury is eliminated . . . by an appropriate warning in respect to the
hazard.
Id. at 802, 194 S.E.2d at 428.
84. Harvey, 311 Ga. at 815, 860 S.E.2d at 568.
85. GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, para. X. The court disagreed with each of the Harveys’
arguments:
[T]hat by reviving all claims that had expired prior to enactment of the statute,
former paragraph (d)(1) violate[d] both the Georgia Constitution’s prohibition
against ex post facto laws and their due process rights under the federal and
state constitutions. The Harveys also argue[d] that former paragraph (d)(1)
violate[d] their equal protection rights under the federal and state constitutions.
Harvey, 311 Ga. at 823–24, 860 S.E.2d at 573.
86. Hunter v. Johnson, 259 Ga. 21, 22, 376 S.E.2d 371, 372 (1989) (citing Allrid v.
Emory Univ., 249 Ga. 35, 37–38, 285 S.E.2d 521, 524 (1982); Pritchard v. Savannah R. Co.,
87 Ga. 294, 13 S.E.2d 493 (1891)).
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sue to receive a remedy for their damages, but they do not have anything
to do with a party having a vested right to sue.87
Retroactive statutes of limitations are constitutional because
defendants do not have a vested right in statutes of limitations.88
Consequently, in Canton Textile Mills, Inc. v. Lathem, the Georgia
Supreme Court held that a retroactive worker’s compensation claim was
constitutional because the legislative intent was to provide people with a
remedy.89 The court reasoned that legislatures could provide a remedy
through a retroactive statute of limitations because parties have no right
to any particular time period.90 Thus, “[o]rdinarily, there is no
constitutional impediment to giving retroactive effect to statutes that
govern only procedure of the courts.”91
2. Equal Protection Rights
The Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and
Georgia’s Constitution prohibit the denial of the equal protection of the
laws for any person.92 When reviewing the constitutionality of civil
statutes under these protections, courts first decide the applicable level
of scrutiny.93 The scrutiny levels differ between two classifications:
suspect classification or fundamental rights, and every other issue.94 The
lowest level of scrutiny, rational basis review, is used when the issue does

87. Hunter, 259 Ga. at 22, 376 S.E.2d at 372.
88. The constitutionality of retroactive statute of limitations has been upheld by the
Georgia Supreme Court on multiple occasions. Canton Textile Mills, Inc. v. Lathem, 253
Ga. 102, 104, 317 S.E.2d 189, 191–92 (1984); see also Vaughn v. Vulcan Materials Co., 226
Ga. 163, 164, 465 S.E.2d 661, 662 (1996) (“[t]here is no vested right in a statute of
limitation.”).
89. Generally, laws are only directed
[F]or the future, and usually will not be given retrospective operation. They will
be given retrospective operation, however, when the language imperatively
requires it, or when an examination of the act as a whole leads to the conclusion
that such was the legislative purpose.
Canton Textile Mills, Inc., 253 Ga. at 104, 317 S.E.2d at 192.
90. Id. at 105, 317 S.E.2d at 192–93.
91. Hunter, 259 Ga. at 21, 376 S.E.2d at 372 (citing Pritchard, 87 Ga. at 294, S.E.2d at
493; Allrid, 249 Ga. at 37, 285 S.E.2d at 521).
92. These protections extend to both criminal and civil actions. U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 1; GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, para. 1.
93. Harvey, 311 Ga. at 827, 860 S.E.2d at 576.
94. Individual groups that have been historically discriminated against—due to race,
religion, national origin, or alienage—fall in the suspect classification category.
Fundamental rights are those laid out in the Constitution. See Amber-Phillips v. SSM
DePaul Health Center, 459 S.W.3d 901 (Mo. 2015) (describing suspect classification).
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not fall under suspect classification or infringe on fundamental rights.95
When reviewing the statutes under the rational basis scrutiny level,
“[e]qual protection is violated only if the means adopted by the statute,
or the classifications used, are irrelevant to the government’s legitimate
objective, or are altogether arbitrary.”96
IV. COURT’S RATIONALE
In Harvey, the Georgia Supreme Court was tasked with deciding many
questions regarding the applicability of Georgia law, Quebec law, and the
HPA to each of Merchan’s claims.97
A. Statutory Analysis of O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33.1
When a court decides the meaning of a statute, it must reflect on the
text of the statute itself.98 A court must interpret the statute “in its most
natural and reasonable way, as an ordinary speaker of the English
language would.”99 When reviewing statutes, Georgia courts have also
generally looked “to other provisions of the same statute, the structure
and history of the whole statute, and the other law—constitutional,
statutory, and common law alike—that forms the legal background of the
statutory provision in question.”100 Georgia courts have previously
“presume[d] that the General Assembly meant what it said and said what
it meant” when creating legislation.101 The Georgia Supreme Court
followed this standard for statutory review and application here.102 The
court first analyzed the wording of O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33.1 to conclude that
claims from other jurisdictions could be brought under the statute. The
court concluded that the statutory language at issue, “would be[,]” was

95. Harper v. State, 292 Ga. 557, 560, 738 S.E.2d 584, 588 (2013) (“[r]ational basis
review involves a two-prong evaluation of the challenged statute.”).
96. Id. at 561, 738 S.E.2d at 588 (citing Rainer v. State, 286 Ga. 675, 677–78, 690
S.E.2d 827, 829 (2010)).
97. Harvey, 311 Ga. at 821, 860 S.E.2d at 572.
98. Id. (quoting City of Marietta v. Summerour, 302 Ga. 645, 649, 807 S.E.2d 324, 328
(2017)).
99. Harvey, 311 Ga. at 821–22, 860 S.E.2d at 572 (quoting Deal v. Coleman, 294 Ga.
170, 172–73, 751 S.E.2d 337, 341 (2013)).
100. Zaldivar v. Prickett, 297 Ga. 589, 591, 774 S.E.2d 688, 691 (2015) (quoting May v.
State, 295 Ga. 388, 391–92, 761 S.E.2d 38 (2014)).
101. Summeror, 302 Ga. at 649, 807 S.E.2d at 328 (quoting Deal, 294 Ga. at 172, 751
S.E.2d at 337).
102. Harvey, 311 Ga. at 822, 860 S.E.2d at 572.
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written broadly enough to cover abuse from outside of Georgia.103 The
statutory language demands:
[A]n assessment of past actions under the present set of
circumstances, in this case whether those past acts would violate
Georgia law. Implicit in this assessment is the assumption that the
acts would be in violation of Georgia law if they occurred in Georgia.
Moreover, nothing in the definition of childhood sexual abuse limits
the statute’s reach to crimes committed in Georgia.104

The Harveys argued that O.C.G.A § 9-3-33.1 could only apply to acts
within Georgia—which would exclude the Quebec claims—because
supposedly, acts outside of the state could not violate Georgia statutes.105
The court disagreed and determined that since the statute covered acts
that “‘would be in violation of’ an enumerated statute[,]” the legislature
did not intend for the statute to cover only acts that occurred in
Georgia.106 This court determined the wording of O.C.G.A § 9-3-33.1 was
written broadly enough to include abuse that occurred outside of
Georgia.107
B. Choice of Law
Generally, the applicable procedural law is that of the forum state.108
However, this case falls under an exception to the general rule.109 Foreign
statutes of limitations apply when the foreign law claim is not recognized
in common law, the foreign law has a specified statute of limitations, and
that limitation is shorter than Georgia’s.110 When claims come from civil
law and not common law, statutes of limitations are treated as
substantive rather than procedural.111 Merchan’s claims from Quebec
arose from a cause of action created by civil code, not common law,

103. The statutory portion at issue defined childhood sexual abuse as “‘any act
committed by the defendant against the plaintiff which act occurred when the plaintiff was
under 18 years of age and which act would be in violation of’ enumerated crimes as
prohibited by Georgia statutes, including rape, child molestation, incest, sexual battery,
and aggravated sexual battery.” Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 817, 860 S.E.2d at 569.
109. Id. at 814, 860 S.E.2d at 567.
110. Id.
111. Id.
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because Quebec is a civil law jurisdiction.112 As some of Merchan’s claims
arose from Quebec civil code, the Quebec statute of limitations will apply
if it is shorter than Georgia’s.113 The issue of which statute of limitations
is shorter has not been litigated, and the decision of which is shorter was
remanded to the trial court.114
Additionally, the Harveys argued Quebec law could not be reviewed
here because Merchan waived her right to argue under foreign law in her
pleadings, but the court disagreed.115 Despite Merchan not directly
pleading under foreign law, the court concluded she was not barred from
relying on foreign law.116 While the court allowed the claims for acts that
occurred in Canada to be heard in Georgia, Merchan still had to establish
proper jurisdiction and venue with the court for all claims to be heard.117
These claims had jurisdiction and venue because each party was a
resident of Georgia.118
The court then looked to the doctrine of lex loci delicti to determine the
applicable substantive law for each claim.119 Normally, this doctrine
applies the procedural law of the forum state to every claim, but because
of the foreign law exception, Quebec’s statute of limitations becomes
substantive law that may apply to certain claims.120 Georgia’s
substantive law applies to every claim, but depending on where the tort
occurred, there may be a difference in which statute of limitations
applies.121 The court relied on lex loci delicti to determine Georgia’s
substantive law applies, and the foreign law exception to determine the
statute of limitations applies depending on which jurisdiction the tort
occurred in.122

112. Quebec has a civil law system, but every state except Louisiana has a common law
system. Id. at 817, 860 S.E.2d at 569.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 817, 860 S.E.2d at 569–70.
115. Id. at 818, 860 S.E.2d at 570.
116. Id.
Under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-43 (c), ‘[a] party who intends to raise an issue concerning
the law of another state or of a foreign country shall give notice in his pleading
or other reasonable written notice . . . .’ Under this statute, a party waives the
ability to rely on foreign law when the party fails to provide reasonable notice of
its intent to rely on foreign law . . . . [T]he Harveys have not established that
Merchan cannot now amend her pleadings to provide such notice.
117. Id. at 819, 860 S.E.2d at 570.
118. Id. at 812, 860 S.E.2d at 566.
119. Id. at 813, 860 S.E.2d at 567.
120. Id. at 814, 860 S.E.2d at 567.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 814, 860 S.E.2d at 568.
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C. Continuing Tort Theory
Further, the court rejected Merchan’s argument that the continuing
tort theory applies to her claims.123 Merchan wanted the continuing tort
theory to apply because each act of sexual abuse would be a Georgia
claim, regardless of where the act occurred.124 As she allegedly endured
over twenty years of weekly, if not daily, abuse, it would be difficult to
prove each separate claim.125 As the continuing tort theory applies when
the injured is unaware of the wrongdoing and the injury, the court
decided this theory does not apply to claims of sexual abuse—even if the
abuse occurs for an extended period and the extent of the abuse is not
fully comprehended until years later.126 The court reasoned that the
survivor is aware of the completion of the tort when it occurs, especially
in cases of “violent external means” of abuse. 127 Therefore, a sexual
assault survivor has a discreet, separate claim every time an
independent action of abuse begins and is complete each time it ends.128
D. Constitutionality of O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33.1
Finally, the court reviewed the constitutional rights afforded under
Georgia’s retroactive law prohibition and the equal protection clauses to
determine O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33.1 does not violate either.129 First, the
Harveys argued the statute violated Georgia’s prohibition of retroactive
laws.130 Both the United States Supreme Court and the Georgia Supreme
Court stated statutes of limitations for civil claims that were reopened
by legislation “have ‘never been regarded’” as a “‘fundamental right.’”131
Since statutes of limitations are not constitutional rights, the Harveys
did not have a fundamental right in the statute.132 Thus, the court used

123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 815–16, 860 S.E.2d at 568.
127. Id. at 816, 860 S.E.2d at 569 (quoting Everhart, 229 Ga. at 801, 194 S.E.2d at 428).
128. Id. at 816, 860 S.E.2d at 568.
129. Id. at 823–24, 860 S.E.2d at 573–74.
130. Id. at 824, 860 S.E.2d at 574.
131. Id. (quoting Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314 (1945)); see
Campbell v. Holt, 115 U.S. 620 (1885).
132. Harvey, 311 Ga. at 826, 860 S.E.2d at 575.
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rational basis review.133 Upon review, the court concluded civil revival
statutes are constitutional.134
Further, the Harveys argued the statute was unconstitutional by
comparing it to other states’ laws—using Kansas law as persuasive
authority.135 Again, the court did not agree; “[t]he mere fact that other
states have construed their state laws differently is insufficient reason to
reconsider our own precedent.”136 The constitutionality question
regarding this statute was fully settled and established in Georgia by this
decision, especially the Equal Protection argument. The Due Process
argument had been addressed in prior decisions, but the Equal
Protection argument had not yet been addressed. The court decided this
statute does not violate any constitutional rights.137
V. IMPLICATIONS
Abuse comes in many forms, and survivors often need decades to
process and acknowledge their abuse. Georgia’s HPA allows survivors the
chance to receive civil remedies for their childhood sexual abuse.138 The
goal of the HPA is to provide survivors a civil remedy, while also affording
survivors the time to process, and acknowledge their abuse before suing
their abuser. Although this is the HPA’s goal, it does not properly provide
these remedies because implementing this Act is difficult.139 Some
shortcomings of the current HPA include the time lapse between the
actual abuse and when the case is tried, and the decrease in empathy
that comes with hearing an adult speak about their childhood trauma
rather than hearing it directly from a child. Further, the HPA is difficult
to implement due to the inability to bring suits against entities.140
133. Id. Under rational basis review, the Harveys had the burden of proving they were
treated differently than other individuals in this position, and that there was no rational
basis for their treatment. The Harveys did not meet their burden here.
134. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Child USA in Support of Appellee at IV (A), Harvey v.
Merchan, 311 Ga. 811, 860 S.E.2d 561 (2021).
Georgia is on a growing list of at least 29 jurisdictions which have enacted
various laws to revive previously expired child sex abuse claims, and stands
alongside Arizona, California, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Michigan, Minnesota,
Montana, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Utah, Vermont, Virginia,
District of Columbia, and Guam, which have done so explicitly with a
time-limited revival window.
135. Harvey, 311 Ga. at 824–25, 860 S.E.2d at 574.
136. Id. at 825, 860 S.E.2d at 574.
137. Interview with Devin Mashman, Oral Arguer Before the Georgia Supreme Court
for Merchan (Sep. 14, 2021); see also Chase Securities Corp., 325 U.S. at 314.
138. O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33.1.
139. Mangan, supra note 5.
140. Id.
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Entities should be included in the possible defendants under the HPA
because the threat of money is typically not a deterrent for individual
abusers, so the Act is not providing much compensation or deterrence of
abuse. Entities are more likely to be deterred than an individual abuser
when they know they will be held monetarily liable.141 If the legislation
does not include entities, it is not affording a large portion of survivors
redress, nor is it deterring a large portion of abuse coverups.
Georgia’s proposed version of the HPA allows survivors to sue entities
for their knowledge of the abuse and coverups of the abuse. If the
legislation passes, it may increase the amount of litigation brought
towards corporations and other large businesses.142 The argument for
prohibiting smaller organizations from being held accountable due to
their lack of resources is not convincing. If any organization is covering
up abuse, it should be held responsible, regardless of its size or number
of resources. To further protect children by deterring abuse and providing
all survivors with redress, the legislation must include entities in the Act.
Georgia is not alone in its retroactive civil remedy for childhood sexual
abuse.143 Other jurisdictions have adopted similar acts—such as
Oklahoma (Hidden Predator Act144) and New York (Child Victims Act145
and Adult Survivors Act146)—but many states have yet to follow suit.147
141. Further, including entities in future legislation will provide far more survivors with
remedies, and hopefully deter childhood abuse, because the threat of monetary damages is
far more convincing to encourage an entity not to act than it is to an individual abuser.
Emma Heatherington et. al., Statute of Limitations for Child Sexual Abuse Civil Lawsuits
in Georgia Update on Case Findings and Opportunities for Reform, CEASE (Apr. 8, 2019),
https://cease.law.uga.edu/sites/default/files/u61/20182019%20CEASE%20White%20Paper%20April%208%202019.pdf.
142. Ga. H.R. Bill 109 (2021) (introduced).
143. Twenty-nine other jurisdictions have enacted similar statutes. Devin Mashman,
Retroactive Civil Statutes of Limitation and Due Process in the Child Sex Abuse Context:
The Unique Need to Access Georgia Courts, 15 CHARLESTON L. REV. 665, 671 (2021)
(discussing the need for retroactive civil limitations).
144. Ok. H.R. Bill 1468, 56 Leg. (2017).
145. Ny. S. Bill S2440, Reg. Sess. (2019); see also Ar. S. Bill 676 (Justice for Vulnerable
Victims of Sexual Abuse), 93 Gen. Assemb. (2021) (extending the civil childhood sexual
abuse statute of limitations from age twenty-one to age fifty-five and opening a two-year
revival period window); Co. S Bill 21-073, 73 Gen. Assemb. (2021) (eliminating the civil
statute of limitations for childhood sexual assault and sexual assault of adults).
146. Ny. S. Bill 66, Reg. Sess. (2021); see also Md. H.R. Bill 974 (2020) (enacting the
Maryland Hidden Predator Act of 2020 and attempting to pass the Hidden Predator Act of
2021 during the 2021 General Assembly, but the newest version of the bill was not passed).
147. If other similar acts are proposed in the future, it is probable the statute of
limitations age increase will be implemented from Georgia’s newest proposal of the Act.
The argument for the age increase is solidified enough that if other states will implement
acts of their own, the legislators will probably look to the discoveries Georgia legislators
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There is a potential for similar acts to be passed in other jurisdictions,
but most states do not have acts like the HPA, nor are they proposing
any at this time.148 Legislators predicted Georgia’s HPA would
significantly increase the amount of civil litigation. 149 Although it has
increased, the increase has been minimal and far below the level
expected. This decision may substantially increase litigation, allowing
survivors to bring suit for abuse that occurred elsewhere if their claims
have jurisdiction in Georgia. These claims must still have the proper
subject matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, and venue to be heard
within the state. As the Harvey decision clarified that the wording of the
HPA applies to abuse occurring outside the state of Georgia, survivors
may feel more freedom to bring suit under the Act.150
After this case, sexual abuse survivors will be aware that the
continued tort theory does not apply to claims of sexual abuse, and that
each instance of abuse is a separate claim.151 Survivors will also be aware
that they can bring suit under the HPA, even for claims from outside of
Georgia, because the court confirmed its constitutionality. If this case
had been decided differently, the ability for many survivors to receive
damages for their childhood sexual abuse would have been closed off
because their claims would have been time-barred. Despite this possible
outcome, it is more probable that this decision will encourage survivors
to bring suit, regardless of where the abuse occurred, if there is proper
jurisdiction in Georgia. The court resolved that the HPA could be used

made in determining how long it takes a survivor to discover their abuse. As for the future
of Georgia’s Act, the age may increase if the proposed legislation passes, but it is unlikely
to increase much more than that, if at all, due to the lack of evidence of childhood sexual
abuse that anyone over the age of fifty-two could procure. Ga. H.R. Bill 109 (2021).
148. Some states are enacting laws with an opposite message towards survivors of all
ages. Under Texas’ newest abortion law, S.B. 8, survivors have little to no civil remedy for
rape or incest. Instead, survivors could be punished for the actions of their abuser. If a
Texan’s abuse also occurred in Georgia, or their abuser resides in Georgia, the Harvey
decision could potentially offer them civil relief for their abuse The trend of the Texas
legislature could potentially be the trend of many jurisdictions. See, e.g., Tex. S. Bill 8, 87
Leg. (2021) (enacted).
149. Still, the HPA’s goal of providing civil remedies to survivors is far more important
than the number of judicial resources potentially used. Harvey, 311 Ga. at 811, 860 S.E.2d
at 565.
150. Id.; O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33.1.
151. This decision on the continued tort theory determines that acts of abuse are acts
where the abuse occurred, even if the continued effects of the abuse are felt in Georgia.
Harvey, 311 Ga. at 816, 860 S.E.2d at 568.
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for cases of this nature, which opens the door for more survivors to receive
redress. 152
While the court in Harvey and the HPA have made great strides to
provide remedies for survivors and deter abuse, the legislation has not
fully taken the necessary steps to achieve these goals. Until the
legislation adds the possibility for suits against entities and raises the
tolling discovery age, survivors will not be adequately protected from or
compensated for their abuse.

152. Cases of this nature can be brought under the HPA, but the facts of this case are
rare, because not many survivors are moved across country lines while experiencing the
abuse. Children are moved across state lines while experiencing abuse quite regularly, but
less often are they moved across country lines, as was the case here. Id. at 812, 860 S.E.2d
at 566.

